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1. Introduction 
A great deal of economic analysis treats aggregate community demand as if it were the 
demand of a single competitive "representative" consumer. Representative consumer models 
allow analysts to focus on economic efficiency, leaving equity considerations aside. However, 
the aggregation across consumers that is implicit in these models is often problematic. Aggre­
gate community demand might violate revealed preference axioms that would be satisfied if 
there were just one consumer. As a result, representative consumer models could misrepresent 
the effects of changes in endowments, technology or policy on prices and aggregate consump­
tion. But this is not the only problem. Even when aggregate community demand satisfies 
the strong axiom and therefore is indistinguishable from the demand of a single competitive 
consumer, the single-consumer model might not be adequate for evaluating efficiency. The 
representative consumer can be Pareto inconsistent, preferring an aggregate situation A to B 
even though all the actual consumers in the community prefer B to A, cí. Jerison (1984) and 
Dow and Werlang (1988). 
Should representative consumers be banished from economic analysis because they might 
be Pareto inconsistent? That would be going too far. The inconsistencies might be very small 
or might arise only in unrealistic settings. In Jerison's (1984) example of inconsistency, a 
payment of less than 0.5% of aggregate income is enough bring the representative consumer 
into agreement with the actual consumers in the community. Dow and Werlang (1988) give an 
example of a larger Pareto inconsistency, but it is not robusto It requires a special discontinuity 
in the way that the consumers' incomes vary depending on prices and aggregate income. 
This paper examines the sizes of possible Pareto inconsistencies and the conditions under 
which they can occur. Since the goal is to study models that are used to analyze changes in 
endowments, technology and policy, we must allow aggregate income to vary independently of 
prices. At the same time, we restrict attention to representative consumers who are perfectly 
representative in the positive sense. These "positive" representative consumers demand the 
aggregate demand vector no matter what aggregate income and prices prevail. The reasons 
for restricting attention to positive representative consumers are discussed below; for now, 
we note that any Pareto inconsistencies exhibited by positive representative consumers could 
only be amplified if the representative consumers' demands were allowed to differ from the 
aggregate demando 
The adequacy of a representative consumer model depends on which policies or events 
and which communities are to be analyzed. If all the actual consumers are identical then 
there is a positive representative consumer model that makes accurate predictions and welfare 
judgments for all possible policies and events. But this is certainly a limited case, considering 
varied consumer behavior we observe. In order to apply the conclusions from representative 
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consumer models to broader classes of communities, it is necessary to restriet the range of 
possible policies and events. 
Positive representative consumers exist only for extremely implausible communities if 
there is no restriction on the distribution of income. Existence of a positive representative 
consumer requires aggregate demand to be determined by aggregate income and prices at 
almost aH price vectors. Therefore, redistribution of income (at fixed prices) must have no 
effeet on aggregate demando This implies that for each good, at aH prices and income levels, 
aH consumers' marginal propensities to consume are equal, cí. Antonelli (1886) and Gorman 
(1953). In order to avoid making such an unrealistic assumption, we restriet attention to 
events and policies that change relative prices. Such events and policies are different from 
pure redistributions of income, so pure redistributions are ruled out a priori. It foHows that 
we can treat the consumers' incomes as functions of the aggregate income and prices. Then 
aggregate demand is a weH-defined function of aggregate income and prices without any 
further assumptions about consumer preferences. A (positive) representative consumer lS 
simply a utility function that generates the aggregate demand function. 
A striking example of a representative consumer that fits the framework we are con­
sidering is in Lucas (1987). He considers an infinite horizon model with a Cobb-Douglas 
consumer who discounts future consumption at arate chosen to match certain features of 
aggregate U.S. demando He shows that this consumer would be willing to reduce its initial 
consumption by 42% if it could raise its growth rate in consumption from 3% to 6%. Policies 
capable of generating such changes in the equilibrium consumption growth rate appear in the 
endogenous growth literature, cí. Stokey and Rebelo (1995). In the framework of the present 
paper, these policies can be represented through their effects on intertemporal prices and 
the consumers' income or wealth levels. One might ask if the surprisingly strong preference 
for growth in Lucas' example could be caused by Pareto inconsistency of the representative 
consumero Could the representative consumer's preferences differ substantiaHy from the pref­
erences of the actual consumers in the community? We will see in seetion 4 that the answer 
lS no. 
The main contributions of this paper are as foHows. We describe a simple way to con­
struct robust examples of representative consumers with large Pareto inconsistencies. In one 
example, the actual consumers require 56% more income than the representative consumer 
requires in order to be compensated for the doubling of a price. But in this example there 
is a Giffen good for aH the consumers. We show, on the other hand, that if aH goods are 
normal and the consumers receive fixed shares of the aggregate income, then there cannot 
be large Pareto inconsistencies, given the amount of price variation arising in typical ap­
plications. Even when there are inferior goods, Pareto inconsistencies must be smaH if the 
representative consumer has homothetic preferences, as it has in Lucas' (1987) example and 
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most macroeconomic models. 
Pareto consistency is necessary in order for the representative consumer's preferences to 
have a social welfare interpretation. Dow and Werlang (1988) show that it is sufficient as 
well. If the representative consumer is Pareto consistent, then its preferences coincide with 
preferences derived from a particular Bergson-Samuelson social welfare funetion. It is there­
fore worthwhile trying to characterize the communities with Pareto consistent representative 
consumers. 
A wel1-known sufficient condition for existence of a Pareto consistent representative con­
sumer is for income to be distributed optimal1y according to sorne social welfare funetion no 
matter what prices prevail, cí. Samuelson (1956), Chipman and Moare (1979). We show that 
this sufficient condition is not necessary. Optimality of the distribution rule is essential1y 
local1y equivalent to symmetry and positive semidefiniteness of a matrix of covariances of the 
consumers' marginal propensities to consume and their marginal utility vectors with respeet 
to prices, cí. Jerison (1994). For a representative consumer to exist, this matrix of covariances 
must be symmetric, but not necessarily positive semidefinite. We give an example of a Pareto 
consistent representative consumer in a community in which the matrix of covariances is not 
positive semidefinite (hence the distribution rule is not optimal with respect to any social wel­
fare funetion). We also show that when there are only two goods and two consumers, a Pareto 
consistent representative consumer exists if the matrix of covariances is nonzero everywhere. 
We already noted that this paper restriets attention to positive representative consumers, 
or, more precisely, to communities for which there is a single consumer whose demand is the 
aggregate demand at al1 aggregate incomes and prices. Users of representative consumer 
models can always say that their analyses meant to apply only to such communities. And 
such communities always existo Each competitive consumer has a class of communities for 
which it is a positive representative consumer. It is interesting to know in which of these 
communities the representative consumer can be to evaluate efficiency. Another reason for 
considering only positive representative consumers is that aggregate time series demand data 
rarely violate the strong axiom of revealed preference. Thus the limited aggregate data we 
have are often consistent with existence of positive representative consumers, cí. Landsburg 
(1981), Varian (1982). 
The framework and notation are presented in the next seetion. Section 3 introduces the 
matrix of covariances and uses it to characterize economies with representative consumers 
when the actual consumers' incomes are determined by prices and the aggregate income. Sec­
tion 4 presents examples of Pareto inconsistent representative consumers along with bounds 
on the inconsistencies. Seetion 5 examines conditions under which a Pareto consistent repre­
sentative consumer exists. 
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2. Notation 
We consider a group of m 2:: 2 competitive consumers in an n-good economy. Each 
consumer i has a column-vector valued demand function Xi(yi, p) generated by a utility 
ifunction u . The corresponding indirect utility function vi(yi,p) is assumed to be twice 
continuously differentiable with strict1y positive marginal utility ofincome, ovi(yi ,p)joyi > O. 
The expenditure function of consumer i is ei(u,p). At price vector p, with income yi, consumer 
i has the marginal propensity to consume Mi(yi,p) == OXi(yi,p)joyi, the average propensity 
to consume Ai(yi,p) == Xi(yi,p)jyi and the Slutsky matrix 
where the superscript T denotes the transpose. 
An economic situation is represented by (y,p), where y is aggregate income (the sum of 
the consumers' incomes) and p » Ois a vector of n prices. 2 A mean situation is a vector (z, p) 
where z represents the average of the consumers' incomes and p is a price vector. We al10w 
aggregate income to vary independent1y of prices so that the model can apply to comparative 
static analyses of changes in endowments, technology or policy. The group members might be 
thought of as members of a family or as citizens of a smal1 country so that their consumption 
has no effect on prices. 
We will use the term community to mean the group of consumers along with a "distribu­
tion rule" specifying their incomes as functions of aggregate income and prices. A distribution 
rule is a continuously differentiable function D = (DI, ... ,Dm) 2:: O, homogeneous of degree 
1, satisfying ¿ Di(y,p) = Y and D~(y,p) > O. Here and below, subscripts denote partial 
derivatives. Di(y,p) is the income of consumer i in situation (y,p). The income share of 
consumer i in situation (y,p) » O is Di(y,p)jy. A distribution rule need not be determined 
by private ownership. It can incorporate the effects of redistributive policies. Since there 
are no consumption externalities in our model, al1ocation by means of distribution rules is 
essential1y equivalent to al1ocation that is Pareto efficient in every situation, cí. Bourguignon 
and Chiappori (1992).3 
A distribution rule D determines aggregate demand as a function of aggregate income 
and prices: 
It also determines the vector of consumer utilities VD(y,p) with ith component VDi(y,p) == 
vi[Di(y,p),p]. We say that there is a representative consumer for D if the aggregate de­
mand function X D is generated by a utility function. When such a utility function exists, 
it determines preferences oVer situations and also oVer mean situations. We say that the 
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representative consumer is Pareio consistent if it prefers one situation to another whenever 
al1 the consumers prefer the former to the latter. Formal1y, the representative consumer 
with indirect utility function vD(y,p) is Pareio consistent if VD(y,p) ~ VD(z,q) implies 
vD(y,p) > vD(z,q). 
The distribution rule D is optimal for w : IRm -t IR if, for each (y,p) ~ O and each 
vector of incomes (yl, ... ,ym) 2:: O satisfying L: yi ~ y, we have 
(1) 
The distribution rule is optimal for w if in every situation there is no alternative distribution 
of the aggregate income that yields a higher value of w. A social welfare function (in the given 
community) is a nondecreasing real-valued function on IRm that is strictly increasing on the 
set of attainable utility vectors {VD(y,p)l(y,p) ~ O}.4 We cal1 D optimal if it is optimal 
for some social welfare function. Note that a constant function cannot be a social welfare 
function, so distribution rules are not necessarily optima1. In fact, Jerison (1994) shows that 
a typical (i.e., generic) distribution rule is not optimal with respect to any social welfare 
function. 
3. Existence of a Representative Consumer 
As noted in the introduction, existence of a representative consumer requires the Slutsky 
matrix of the aggregate demand function to be symmetric and negative semidefinite. These 
conditions are not satisfied automatical1y because the Slutsky matrix of aggregate demand 
generally differs from the sum of the individual consumers' Slutsky matrices. The difference 
matrix can be interpreted as the covariance matrix of two vector valued random variables (or 
as part of the covariance matrix of a single vector-valued random variable). Dnder certain 
conditions the matrix can be estimated from cross section or time series data. This section 
defines the "covariance matrix" and shows that when it is symmetric and positive semidefinite 
a representative consumer exists. Symmetry of the covariance matrix is necessary for existence 
of a representative consumer whereas positive semidefiniteness is noto Gn the other hand, 
both conditions are necessary in order for the distribution rule to be optimal with respect to 
sorne social welfare function, cí. Jerison (1994). Section 5, below, shows that if the covariance 
matrix is positive definite on a hyperplane and if there are only two goods and two consumers, 
then there is a Pareto consistent representative consumer. 
It seems then that the covariance matrix should be of special interest to any user of 
representative consumer models for normative analysis. For this reason we offer a number 
of interpretations for the aboye restrictions on the covariance matrix along with examples of 
communities in which the properties are satisfied. 
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The j k component of the covariance matrix will be defined to be the covariance of the 
consumers' marginal propensities to consume good j and their "adjusted demands" for good 
k. The adjusted demand of consumer i at situation (y, p) is 
XDi(y,p) == [1/D~(y,p)][Xi(Di(y,p),p) - D~(y,p)], 
where the subscripts on Di denote partial derivatives. When aggregate income is fixed, 
a consumer's adjusted demand vector is orthogonal to the consumer's indifference curve in 
price space (taking account of the way the consumer's income Di is affected by price changes). 
Thus, the adjusted demand vector X Di(1,p) is parallel to the vector of price derivatives 
8VDi(1,p)/8p. (This is easily verified using Roy's identity.) The homogeneity of D implies 
that p . X Di (y, p) = y, so the adjusted demand vector lies in the frontier of the aggregate 
budget seto The adjusted demand for good k is approximately equal to the change in aggregate 
income y required to compensate consumer i for a unit change in the price of good k taking 
account of the effect of the price change on the consumer's income. 
The covariance matrix is defined to be
 
CD(y,p) == ¿ D~(y,p)Mi(Di(y,p),p)[XDi(y,p) - XD(y,p)f.
 
z 
It is the covariance matrix of the consumers' marginal propensities to consume and their 
adjusted demands, with consumers weighted by their marginal income shares D~(y,p). (This 
uses the fact that the mean of the adjusted demands is the aggregate demand: 
¿ D~(y,p)XDi(y,p) = ¿[Xi(Di(y,p),p) - D~(y,p)] = XD(y,p).) 
Dnder the smoothness assumptions of our model, there is a representative consumer for 
the distribution rule D if and only if the Slutsky matrix of aggregate demand is symmetric 
and negative semidefinite, cf. Richter (1979, Theorem 12). As a consequence we have 
Proposition 1. Tbere is a representative consumer ii tbe covariance matrix CD(y,p) is 
symmetric and positive semidefinite at eacb (y,p). Symmetry oi tbis covariance matrix is 
necessary ior existence oi a representative consumero 
Prooi Let yi == Di(y,p). The Slutsky matrix of aggregate demand is 
SD(y,p) == X~(y,p) + X~(y,p)XD(y,pf 
= ¿[Mi(yi,p)D~(y,p) +X;(yi,p)] + ¿Mi(yi,p)D~(y,p)XD(y,p)T 
i i 
= ¿[X;(yi,p) + Mi(yi,p)Xi(yi,p)] 
i 
- ¿Mi(yi,p)[Xi(yi,p) - D~(y,p)] + ¿ D~(y,p)Mi(yi,p)XD(y,pf 
i i 
= L Si(yi,p) - CD(y,p). 
i 
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Since each consumer's Slutsky matrix Si(yi,p) is symmetric and negative semidefinite, CD 
must be symmetric for SD to be symmetric. If in addition CD is positive semidefinite, then 
SD is negative semidefinite. 
o 
Remark 1. Requiring tbe covanance matrix CD(y,p) to be symmetric and positive 
semidennite does not restriet tbe form of tbe demand funetion of any consumero For ex­
ample if the consumers have the same arbitrary demand function and equal income shares, 
then the covariance restrictions are satisfied with CD = O. On the other hand, symmetry 01 
the covariance matrix is not robusto It is lost under perturbation of the consumers' preferences 
when there are at least three goods, d. Jerison (1994). Thus, in a typical economy with more 
than two goods there is no representative consumero 
Remark 2. To illustrate the covariance restrictions, consider a consumption sector in 
which the consumers' demands have Muellbauer's (1976) PIGLOG form, 
(2) 
iwhere a and bi are functions from IRn into IRn. The c1ass (2) inc1udes as special cases 
nonidentical homothetic preferences (with bi = O), the AID system of Deaton and Muell­
bauer (1980) and demands generated by commonly used indirect translog utility functions, 
d. Christensen, et. al. (1975). If the consumers' income shares are fixed, with D(y,p) = y(), 
the covariance matrix becomes C D (l,p) = L: ()i(bi +ci)(cif - L: ()i(bi +ci)L: ()i(cif, where 
bi and ci are evaluated at p with ci(p) == ai(p) + bi(p) in ()i. This is the covariance matrix 
of the consumers' bi and ci vectors. It is symmetric and positive semidefinite if the bis or 
if the cis are identical across consumers, though neither of these restrictions is necessary for 
symmetry or positive semidefiniteness. 
Remark 3. If the consumers have fixed income shares ()i, then the covariance matrix is 
D '" i i DT '" i i DTe (y,p) = ¿()iM [(X /()i) - X ] = y ¿()iM (A - A ) , (3) 
aggregate income times the covariance matrix of the consumers' marginal and average propen­
sities to consume, with consumers weighted by their income shares. Thus, positive semidefi­
niteness of the covariance matrix with fixed income shares implies that consumers with larger 
than average budget shares for a good also tend to have higher marginal propensities to 
consume that good. 
Remark 4. If the consumers' income shares are fixed, positive semidefiniteness of the co­
variance matrix is equivalent to "increasing dispersion," the requirement that the consumers' 
demands become more dispersed when their incomes rise by equal amounts. To make this 
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precise, consider a situation (y, p) and imagine a thought experiment in which aH consumers 
are given an additional income transfer ~. The demand of consumer i is then Xi(yi +~,p), 
where yi = ()iY. Letting x be a vector of length 1, the dispersion in the consumers' demand 
vectors in the direction x can be measured by the variance of the scalars x . Xi(yi + ~,p), 
with consumers weighted equally: 
~~ xTXi(yi +~,p)Xi(yi +~,pf x _ --; ¿ xTXi(yi +~,p) ¿ Xi(yi +~,p)T x. 
mL.J m 
To find the effect of a small income transfer, we differentiate this variance with respect ~ and 
evaluate at ~ = O. We obtain xT[C(y,p) +C(y,pf]x, where 
- 1~ .... T 1~ .. D TC(y,p) == - L.J M1(y\p)X1(y\p) - -2 L.J M1(y\p)X (y,p) . 
m m 
We say that the community exhibits increasing dispersion if for each (y, p), the matrix 
C(y, p) is posi tive semidefinite on the hyperplane orthogonal to the aggregate demand vector 
XD(y,p). This means that the consumers' demand vectors become more dispersed (or at least 
not less dispersed) in aH directions orthogonal to the aggregate demand when the consumers' 
incomes all rise by the same small amount. A community with fixed income shares exhibits 
increasing dispersion if and only if its covariance matrix C D (y, p) is positive semidefinite for 
each (y,p), cf. Jerison (1994, Remark 3). 
The hypothesis of increasing dispersion can be tested using the nonparametric statistical 
method of average derivatives. Hiirdle, et. al. (1991), Hildenbrand (1994), Kneip (1993) show 
that French, U.K. and U.S. consumer expenditure data are consistent with the hypothesis. 
In testing for increasing dispersion, the number of commodities matters. With very narrowly 
defined commodity categories there are likely to be inferior goods. If a good is bought only 
by poorer households then the dispersion in household demands is likely to fall when incomes 
rise. In spite of this, French data are consistent with increasing dispersion when commodities 
are grouped in 60 aggregated categories. 
Remark 5. It is easy to verify that CD(y,p)p = CD(y,p)TP = O. In addition, the n x n 
symmetrized covariance matrix C D+(CD)T is the sum of 2m rank 1 matrices, so it cannot have 
rank greater than max{2m, n -1}. When it has this maximal rank, positive semidefiniteness 
of the covariance matrix is a robust condition that is preserved under perturbation of the 
consumers' preferences. 
4. Nonrepresentative Representative Consumers 
We have noted that representative consumers need not be Pareto consistent. But to 
what extent can the representative consumer's preferences differ from the preferences of the 
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actual members of the community? In this section we show how to construct examples of 
consumption sectors in which the difference is substantia1. Gn the other hand, we show that 
the difference must be considerably smaHer if the representative consumer has homothetic 
preferences. The foHowing result is useful for constructing examples of Pareto inconsistency. 
Remark 6. If all the consumers are indifferent between two situations but the representa­
tive consumer is not, then the representative consumer is Pareto inconsistent. 
To see this, we note first that if a representative consumer exists, it can be assumed to have a 
el indirect utility function v. This foHows from the fact that the aggregate demand function 
is el. Homogeneity of the consumers' indirect utility functions implies that without loss of 
generality we can let aggregate income equal1. Suppose that aH members of the consumption 
sector are indifferent between the price vectors P and q, but the representative consumer is 
noto Then VD(p) = VD(q) and v(l,p) < v(l, q). This last inequality is preserved if aH 
components of q are proportionally decreased by a smaH enough amount. But then every 
consumer prefers p to q even though the representative consumer prefers q to p. 
4.1 A Represeutative Consumer with a Large Pareto Inconsistency 
We will consider consumption sectors with two goods and two consumers with equal 
income shares. If the consumers' preferences are homothetic, then there is a Pareto consistent 
representative consumero We will start with a pair of homothetic consumers and modify their 
preferences in order to obtain a consumption sector with a Pareto inconsistent representative 
consumer. 1et the price of good 2 be fixed at 1. We start with a homothetic consumer i (for 
i = 1,2) with an indirect utility function vi, expenditure function e i and demand function 
xi(yi ,p) for good 1. The homothetic consumers 1 and 2 are indifferent between the mean 
situations A = (1, q) and B = (z,j5), but their indifference curves through A and B do not 
intersect at any other points in the space of income and the price of good 1. Figure 1 shows 
the consumers' indifference curves in that space. Letting Ui be the utility of consumer i in the 
mean situations A and B, we see that el(uI,q) = e2(u2,q) = 1 and el(uI'p) = e2(u2,p) = z. 
The corresponding representative consumer is also indifferent between the mean situations A 
and B. 
In a two good economy, a consumer's (smooth) demand function x(y,p) for good 1 
completely determines the consumer's indirect preferences as long as the demand funct.ion 
satisfies the Slutsky condition 
ox(y,p) + ( )ox(y,p) < O 
x y,p o -' OPI Y 
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Using this faet, we can specify new consumer preferences by changing consumer i's demand 
funetion for good 1 to xi(yi,p) = <Pi(vi(yi,p) - Ui)xi(yi,p) for i = 1,2, where <Pi: ffi -t (0,1) 
is a smooth function with <p~(t) > O for t < O and <pi(t) = 1 for t 2: O. The new demand 
for good 1 is the same as the old demand at points above the consumer's indifference curve 
through A and is strict1y less than the old demand at points below that indifference curve. It 
is easy to verify that the new demand funetion for good 1 satisfies the Slutsky condition if the 
old one does. This implies that the new demand functions xi determine a new consumption 
sector. 
In the income and price space of Figure 1, consumer i's indifference curve of utility level ui 
is the graph of the expenditure function ei (ui,', 1). Since consumer i's demand for good 1at 
mean situation (y,p) equals 8ei(u;'p)/8pi the modification of i's demand described above 
flattens i's indifference curvesbelow the curve through A while preserving i's indifference 
between A and B. If a representative consumer exists in the new consumption sector then 
its indifference curve through A is flatter than that of the original representative consumer. 
Therefore it passes below B and so, by Remark 6, the representative consumer is Pareto 
inconsistent. 
In order for the new consumption sector to have a representative consumer, the Slutsky 
matrix of aggregate demand must be symmetric and negative semidefinite. Symmetry holds 
automatical1y when there are only two goods. Slutsky negative semidefiniteness requires 
O2: (1/2)( <p~ v~xl + <p~v;x2 + <PIX~ +<P2X;) 
+ (1/4)(<PIXI + <P2x2)(<p~v~xl + <p~v~x2 + <PIX~ + <PIX~) 
= -(1/2)[<p~v~(xl? + <p~v~(x2)2 + <PIX~ +<P2x;l 
+ (1/4)(<PIXI + <P2x2)(<p~V~xl + <p~v~x2 + <PIX~ + <PIX~), 
Here, vi and xi and their derivatives are evaluated at (y,p), and the subscripts y andp denote 
partial derivatives with respect to the first and second arguments, y and PI. Both <Pi and <p~ 
are evaluated at vi(y,p) - Ui for each i. 
When each <Pi is sufficient1y close to 1, the Slutsky condition above is satisfied. This 
fol1ows from the fact that there is a representative consumer when the actual consumers have 
homothetic preferences. So the argument above shows that there can be a Pareto inconsistent 
representative consumero The question is how inconsistent. If each <Pi is close to 1, then 
the modified consumer preferences are nearly homothetic and the representative consumer's 
indifference curve through A passes close to B. Thus the inconsistency is smal1. To obtain 
a large inconsistency we must make <Pi(t) approach O rapidly as t decreases starting fr~m 
O. But the Slutsky condition above is violated if either <p~ is too large. For this reason, the 
representative consumer's indifference curve through A cannot be made arbitrarily flato Still, 
it can be made to pass substantial1y below B, as shown by the fol1owing example. 
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Example A. We start with two homothetic consumers characterized by the indirect utility 
functions v1(y,p) = yp~ap~-l and v2(y,p) = Y/(Pl + (JP2), where a = [ln(7 /4)]/ ln2 and 
b = 1/3. Let the consumers receive equal income shares. Then they are indifferent between 
the mean situations (1, q) and (1.75,p), where q = (1,1) and P = (2,1). Let xi be the demand 
function for good 1 corresponding to the indirect utility function vi. As described aboye, we let 
consumer i have a demand for good 1 that is less than xi at mean situations that yield utility 
less than vi(l,q). To be precise, let ~i(t) = exp(-104 t2) for t < Oand ~i(t) = 1 for t ~ O. 
Let consumer i's dem:and function for good 1 be xi == ~i(vi - vi(l,q))x i , for i = 1,2. It can 
be verified that ~i is Coo and satisfies ~~(t) > Ofor t < O. It can be checked numericaHy that 
aggregate demand satisfies Slutsky negative semidefiniteness, so the modified consumption 
sector has a representative consumero 
In the modified consumption sector the representative consumer's indifference curve 
through (1, q) is the graph of the function c(t) satisfying c(l) = 1 and the differential equation 
c'(t) = x(c(t), t, 1), where x == (1/2)(x 1 +x2) is the mean demand function. Numerical solu­
tion of this differential equation shows that c(2) < 1.1203. Thus, consumers 1 and 2 require 
75% more income in order to be compensated for a doubling of the price of good 1. But 
the representative consumer requires only 12% more income. The inconsistency ratio is more 
than 1.56. In order to be compensated for the price rise, the actual consumers require over 
56% more than the representative consumer requires. 
o 
In Example A, the consumer's preferences are transformed without changing their indif­
ference curves through the points A and B. Such a transformation is possible because in the 
initial consumption sector the set of mean situations that yield the consumer utility vector 
(u 1, U2) (with the price of good 2 fixed) is disconnected. Jerison (1984) shows that as long as 
the mean situations that yield a given vector of consumer utilities form a connected set, the 
representative consumer must be indifferent among them. The disconnectedness in Figure 1 
comes from the fact that for consumer 2 the goods are perfect complements (a large change 
in relative prices has little effect on the ratio of demands), whereas for consumer 2 the goods 
are substitutes. There is no obvious reason for ruling out such preference profiles. On the 
other hand, they are not completely normal. In the modified economy, good 2 is inferior for 
both consumers. We will consider the case in which aH goods are normal for aH consumers 
below. 
Example A shows that there are consumption sectors with representative consumers 
whose preferences differ greatly from the preferences of the actual consumers. A similar 
argument can be used to show that every utility function can be viewed as the utility of 
a Pareto inconsistent representative consumer for sorne consumption sector. To be precise, 
for every smooth indirect utility function v there exists a consumption sector with a Pareto 
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inconsistent representative consumer whose indirect utility function is v. This can be shown 
by perturbing a consumption sector in which aH consumers have the indirect utility function 
v. 
4.2 A Bound on the Pareto Inconsistency oí a Representative Consumer 
Representative consumers' Pareto inconsistencies cannot be arbitrarily large. This is 
implied by the foHowing fact, which is of independent interest. It is impossible for aH the 
consumers to prefer situation A to B if B is revealed preferred to A for the representative 
consumero 
Lemma 1. If (y,p) is strietly revealed preferred to (z, q) for the representative consumer 
then at least one consumer prefers (y,p) to (z, q). 
Proo[ Suppose that pXi(Di(z, q), q) ~ Di(y, p) for every i. Summing over i yields pX(z, q) ~ 
y. Thus if (y, p) is strictIy revealed preferred to (z, q) by the representative consumer (pX( z, q) < 
y) then pXi(Di(z, q), q) < Di(y,p) and Vi(z, q) < Vi(y,p) for sorne i. 
o 
If aH the consumers are at least as weH off at (z, q) as at (y, p) then aggregate income y can­
not be too high. Lemma 1 implies that y :::; pX(z, q). Similarly, if aH the consumers are at least 
as weH off at (y, p) as at (z, q) then there is a lower bound on y determined by qX(y, p) ~ Z. Let 
y* (q, p) be the minimum y satisfying qX(y, p) ~ 1. It foHows that the inconsistency ratio for 
a move from (1, q) to the price vector p lies in the interval [y*(q, p)/e*(q, p), pX (1, q)/e*(q, p)], 
where e*(q,p) == e(v(l, q),p). 
The interval determines bounds that are not tight. Better bounds can probably be found. 
But for commonly used models and normal price variation, the aboye interval is rather small. 
Consider, for example, a Cobb-Douglas representative consumer in a two-good consumption 
sector. Let the representative consumer's utility function be U(Xl, X2) = xrx~, with a+/3 = 1, 
and let q = (1,1). Then pX(l, q) = apl +/3P2' e*(q,p) = prp~ and y*(q,p) = PIP2/(ap2+/3pI). 
The weakest bound on the inconsistency ratio occurs when a = /3 = 1/2. (This is the case in 
which pX(l, q)/y*(q,p) is maximized.) In this case, the inconsistency ratio lies in the interval 
[2JPIp2/(Pl +P2), (PI +P2)/(2JPIP2]' If, starting at the price vector q = (1,1), the price of 
good 1 doubles and the price of good 2 does not change, then the inconsistency ratio lie~ in 
the interval [.9428,1.0607]. So the compensation required by the Cobb-Douglas representative 
consumer will not differ by more than about 6% from that required by the actual consumers 
when the price of good 1 doubles. 
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4.3 Nonrepresentative Representative Consumers in Macroeconomics 
The nonrepresentative representative consumer in Example A has preferences that are 
far from homothetic. This is not an accidento The bounds on the Pareto inconsistency 
obtained aboye are particularly confining when the representative consumer is homothetic. 
We will illustrate this with examples of CES representative consumers with utility functions 
that often appear in macroeconomic applications. 
Representative consumers in macroeconomics are commonly assumed to have homothetic, 
stationary, completely separable preferences for flows of consumption expenditures over an 
infinite time horizon. The utility function of such a consumer has the form 
00 
u(x) = (L:>stx}-oY/(l-u) , 
t=o 
where x = {xd~o and where Xt is consumption expenditure in period t. The corresponding 
indirect utility and expenditure functions are 
00 00 
fv(y,p) = y(¿<st/upD- 1 / and e(ü,p) = ü . (¿ <st/upD 1/ f , 
t=O t=o 
where E == (o" - 1)/0". In this case, y is interpreted as (lifetime) wealth. If the consumer can 
borrow or save at a constant interest rate r then the price of consumption expenditure in 
period t can be taken to be Pt = (1 + r)-t, and optimal consumption (when it exists) grows 
at the rate g, where 
(4) 
As in the examples aboye, there are only two consumers and their income shares are 
equal. It can be shown that in this case, the consumers' indirect utilities can be expressed 
as functions of the mean income and two price indices. We focus on the case in which these 
indices are for consumption in nonoverlapping time intervals. The price indices can be defined 
by: 
T 00 
a(p) = (¿ <st/upD1 /f and (3(p) = ( ¿ <st/upD1 /f, 
t=o t=T+l 
and interpreted as indices for early and late consumption respectively. The expenditure 
function of the representative consumer can be written as a function of these price indices: 
e(ü,p) = e(ü, a(p), (3(p)), where e(ü,a,b) == (af + bf )l/f. 
The preferences of the representative and the two actual consumers are determined by 
their preferences over bundles of two commodity aggregates whose price indices are defined 
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aboye. The utility funetion of consumer 2 (for the two aggregate commodities) is U 2(XI' X2) == 
(Xl + X2)/(S -1) if SXI + X2 < s and U 2(XI, X2) == [l/(s -1)] + (X2/S) otherwise, where s > 1 
is a fixed scalar. It is easy to verify that u2 is continuous, quasiconcave and nondecreasing. 
Consumer 2 demands strictly positive amounts of both commodity aggregates whenever sb > 
y > a > b, where y is the consumer's income and a and b are the price indices of early and 
late consumption. Gn this region consumer 2 has the indirect utility funetion v2 (y, a, b) = 
[(y - a)/(sb - a)] + s and the demand funetion for good 1 X2 = (sb - y)/(sb - a). At prices 
a and b for the aggregate commodities the demand for good 1 by consumer 1 is Xl (y, a, b) = 
2y[a€-1 /(a€ + be)] - [(sb - y)/(sb - a)]. Suppose that we fix u and aL and let YL == el(u, aL, 1) 
and y(a) == el(u, a, 1), where el is the expenditure function for consumer 1 in terms of the 
aggregated commodities. Then y(.) is the income compensation funetion that solves the 
differential equation Y/Ca) = P(a)y(a) - Q(a), with the initial condition y(aL) = YL, where 
pea) = 2a€-I/(a€ + 1) and Q(a) = s/(s - a). The graph of y(.) is the indifference curve 
for consumer 1 of utility level u in the space of income and the price of "early consumption" 
when the price of late consumption is fixed at 1. The solution to this differential equation is 
(5) 
In the case of Cobb-Douglas preferences, (J' = 1 and E = O. Then equation (5) is replaced 
by 
1 (a) 2m SaL sa 
y(a; YL) = - - [(s - adYL + 1 2 ] - (1 2)( )" (6)s - a aL - m - m s - a 
To construet the examples of inconsistency, we fix T, the date separating early and late 
consumption, and specify alternative values of the interest rateo These interest rates deter­
mine alternative prices of early and late consumption (aj,b j ), for j = L,H. We then find 
YL and YH such that both consumers 1 and 2 are indifferent between the budget situations 
(YL,aL/bL,1) and (YH,aH/bH,1). The YL and YH are the unique solutions to the equa­
tions YH = y(aH /b H;yd and V 2(YL' aL/bL, 1) = V 2 (YH' aH /b H, 1). The solution YH is the 
wealth required by both consumers to compensate for a rise in the relative price of early 
consumption from aL/bL to aH /b H. The wealth required by the representative consumer is 
YR = yL[((aH /bH)€ + 1)/((aL/bd€ + l)P/€. If YR ¡. YH then the representative consumer is 
Pareto inconsistent, and the inconsistency ration is YH /YR. 
We consider Pareto inconsistencies that can arise in the example of Lucas (1987) who 
compared a budget situation in which the representative consumer's consumption expenditure 
grows at 3% to a situation in which the consumption growth rate is 6%. 
Example B. Let 8 = .97 and (J' = 2, so that E = 1/2. These are parameters taken as the 
base case by Stokey and Rebelo (1995) in their analysis of growth under alternative capital 
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and labor tax rates. The optimal (constant) rate of consumption growth for the representative 
consumer changes from 3% to 6% if the interest rate changes from approximate1y 9.37% to 
15.8%. The interest rate determines relative prices of early and late consumption for each value 
of T. It turns out that the inconsistency ratio is maximized when T = 59. For this T, a rise in 
the interest rate from 9.37% to 15.8% raises the relative price of early consumption, a/b, from 
5.43 to 14.67. Taking s = 1.001(aH/bH) ~ 14.68, the inconsistency ratio is approximately 
1.0217. 
Example C. Let /j = .95 and (J = 1. This is the case of Cobb-Douglas utility. The rate of 
consumption growth for the representative consumer rises from 3% to 6% when the interest 
rate changes from 8.4% to 11.58%. Again, taking s = 1.001(aH/bH), the largest inconsistency 
ratio is slight1y below 1.034, and it occurs with T = 30. 
The inconsistencies in these examples are rather small (less than 3.4%). This is well 
below the inconsistency bounds implied by Lemma 1 (9.6% for Example B and 11.8% for 
Example C). But those bounds are not tight, whereas the examples themselves appear to 
be close to the worst possible given the range of relative price variation. In particular, the 
specification of the preferences of consumer 2 (through the choice of s) depends on the range of 
price variation. Over this range, good 1 is inferior for consumer 2. Still, the degree of Pareto 
inconsistency is quite smal!. If both goods were normal for both consumers, the inconsistency 
would be even smaller. 
5. N ormative Representative Consumers 
The Pareto inconsistencies illustrated aboye show that representative consumer mod­
els might not be adequate for normative analysis. On the other hand, Dow and Werlang 
(1988) show that if a representative consumer is Pareto consistent, its preferences have a 
welfare interpretation: they are the same as preferences generated by a particular Bergson­
Samuelson social welfare funetion. To state this result precisely, we say that a representative 
consumer (for D) has a welfare interpretation if its preferences over situations are represented 
by w [YD (y, p)] for sorne nondecreasing funetion w that is strict1y increasing on the set of 
attainable consumer utility veetors {yD(y,p)ly ~ O,p» O}. 
Proposition 2. A representative consumer bas a welfare interpretation ii and only ii it is 
Pareto consistent. 
For a proof, see Dow and Werlang (1988) or Jerison (1994). Note that a social planner might 
have a social welfare funetion that is different from the w in the previous paragraph. Then 
the planners' preferences would differ from those of the representative consumer even if the 
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latter had a welfare interpretation. 
It is an open question under what conditions a consumption sector has a Pareto consistent 
representative consumero Qne well known sufficient condition is that the income distribution 
rule is optimal with respect to a social welfare function. 
Proposition 3. If the income distribution rule is optimal then the consumption sector has 
a Pareto consistent representative consumero 
Chipman and Moore (1979) and Dow and Sonnenschein (1986) show that when D is optimal, 
there is a utility function that generates a correspondence that contains the aggregate demand 
function as a selection. Jerison (1994) shows that since the aggregate demand function is 
smooth, the utility function generates the aggregate demand funetion itself. The distribution 
rule need not be uniquely optimal, but every other optimal rule determines the same aggregate 
demando 
We will show that the distribution rule need not be optimal in order for a Pareto consistent 
representative consumer to existo To do so, we need the following property of consumption 
sectors with optimal income distribution, proved by Jerison (1994). 
Proposition 4. If the income distribution rule D is optimal then for each situation (y, p) 
the covariance matrix CD(y, p) is symmetric and positive semidennite. 
Thus if the covariance matrix fails to be symmetric or positive semidefinite, then there is no 
social welfare funetion for which the distribution rule is optima1. 
Example D. Pareto Consistency Without Qptimal Income Distribution 
In this example the consumption sector has a Pareto consistent representative consumer, 
but the covariance matrix is not positive semidefinite, so the income distribution rule is not 
optimal with respect to any social welfare function. There are two goods and two consumers 
with equal shares of aggregate income. Consumer 1 has Cobb-Douglas utility and demand 
funetion 
xf(y,p) = yj(2PI), 
xi (y, p) = Yj(2p2). 
Consumer 2 has the demand function 
X;(y,p) = (yj2PI) + (pd2y), 
X~(y,p) = (yj2p2) - (pU2P2Y)' 
The demand vector X 2 (y, p) of consumer 2 is nonnegative whenever y ~ PI' We will restrict 
attention to mean incomes and prices in this region. 
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The consumers' indirect utility functions are 
The two consumers receive equal shares of aggregate income, so when they have income y at 
prices P, aggregate demand is 
X(2y,p) = Xl(y,p) + X 2(y,p) 
2 
= ( JL + PI , JL _ --.EL ). 
PI 2y P2 2p2Y 
An indirect utility function for this aggregate demand function is 
y2 PI 
v(y,p) == - --. 
PIP2 P2 
2It is easy to show that vI, v and vare quasiconvex in P over the region where X 2 » o. 
To show that the distribution rule is not optimal with respect to any social welfare 
function it suffices to show that the covariance matrix of average and marginal properties 
to consume is not positive semidefinite. By (3), the upper left component of this covariance 
matrix is a positive multiple of (M? - Mf)(A~ - AD with each function evaluated at (y,p). 
But we have 
2 I 1 PI 1 PIM -MI =-- -- - =-- < O 
1 2PI 2y2 2PI 2y2 
A2 _ Al = _1_ + ~ __1_ = l?.!..- > O. 
1 1 2PI 2y2 2PI 2y2 
Thus the covariance matrix is not positive semidefinite, and the income distribution cannot 
be optima1. 
We next show that the representative consumer is Pareto consistent. Let each consumer 
i have income y, and suppose that the price vector P is Pareto superior to q. Then 
2 2 
_y_ _ PI > L _ ql 
PIP2 P2 ql q2 q2 
with at least one strict inequality. Adding the second inequality to three times the first, we 
see that 
4y2 
v(2y,p) = ­
PIP2 
-
PI 
-
P2 
4y2 
> ­
ql q2 
-
ql
-
q2 
= v(2y,q), 
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so the representative consumer prefers the price vector p to q at aggregate income 2y. This 
shows that the representative consumer is Pareto consistent. 
It remains an open question how to characterize consumption sectors with Pareto con­
sistent representative consumers. The next result provides a sufficient condition in a special 
case. 
Proposition 5. In a community witb two goods, two consumers and a representative 
consumer, tbe representative consumer is Pareto consistent if for eacb p ~ O tbe matrix of 
covariances C D (l,p) is nonzero. 
In a two-good economy, the matrix of covariances is symmetric. If it is positive semidefi­
nite, then a representative consumer exists. If in addition the matrix is nonzero, then, by 
Proposition 5, the representative consumer is Pareto consistent. 
Figure 2 shows the main idea in the proof. In the figure, the actual consumers, 1 and 2, 
prefer A to B, but the representative consumer prefers B to A. By minimizing the utility of 
the representative consumer along the indifference curve of consumer 2 through A, we obtain 
a point C at which aH three consumers' indifference curves are tangent. At such a point, 
the matrix of covariances is O, so as long as that matrix is nonzero there cannot be Pareto 
inconsistency. 
Proof of Proposition 5: Suppose that aH the consumers in the community prefer (z, q) to 
(y,p), but the representative consumer prefers (y,p) to (z, q). We will show that this leads to 
a contradiction. By the homogeneity of D and of each consumer's indirect utility function, 
there is no loss of generality in assuming that q2 = P2. If ql = PI then there cannot be 
a Pareto inconsistency, since the utility of each consumer (including the representative) IS 
strictly increasing in aggregate income. Assume that PI > ql. 
We begin by showing that XPl(z, q) =F XP2(z, q). RecaH that ¿i Dt = 1 and ¿i DtXDi = 
X D, with Dt > O for each i. Also, for each i, XDi(p, y) and XD(p, y) satisfy the same 
budget identity, px = y. Since there are only two goods, if XPl(z, q) = XP2(z, q) then 
X D1 (z,q) = X D2 (z,q) = XD(z,q). But then CD(z,q) = O, contradicting the hypothesis. 
This proves that XPl(z,q) =F XP2(z,q), and without loss of generality we can assume that 
XPl(z,q) > XP2(z,q). It foHows that XP(z,q) > XP2(z,q), since ¿DtXDi = XD. 
Consider the minimization problem 
min v(y,p) 
y,p 
and V D2(y,p) = V D2 (z, q). 
The constraint set is compact and contains (z, q), so the problem has a solution denoted 
(y* ,p*). If pr = PI then p* = P and y* > y, since V D2 (f},p) < V D2 (z, q) = V D2 (y* ,p*). But 
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then v(y*,p*) > v(y,p) > v(z,q), which contradiets the assumption that (y*,p*) solves the 
minimization problem. Thus pr < PI' Since V is nonincreasing in prices and nondecreasing 
in aggregate income, the first two constraints in the minimization problem hold with striet 
inequality. With these constraints not binding, the necessary first order conditions are vy ­
D2>.V = °and vP1 - >.VR2 - ¡.t = O, for nonnegative scalars >. and ¡.t, with ¡.t(pr - ql) = O,y 
where the subscripts denote partial derivatives and a11 functions are evaluated at (y*, p*). 
Note that -vp/v y = X D and - Vf2 /Vy D2 = X D2. SO the first order conditions aboye 
imply that XP(y* ,p*) ~ XP2(y* ,p*), with equality if pr > ql (since pr > ql implies ¡.t = 
O). It fo11ows that (y*,p*) =1 (z,q) since XP(z,q) > XP2(Z,q), and therefore pr > ql 
and XD(y*,p*) = X D2 (y*,p*). This implies that X DI = XD2 = XD at (y*,p*), since 
¿D~XDi = X D. But then CD(y*,p*) = O, which contradicts the hypothesis. This proves 
that there cannot be a Pareto inconsistency of the form described aboye with PI > ql. 
If j5¡ < ql we arrive at a similar contradietion by showing that X P(y, p) is strietly between 
XPI(y,p) and XP2(Y,p), and then by minimizing VDi(y,p) subjeet to v(y,p) = v(Y,p), 
PI ~ PI ~ ql and P2 = P2, where consumer i has the larger XPi(y,p). 
o 
6. Conc1usion 
The problem of charaeterizing communities with Pareto consistent representative con­
sumers remains open. In the examples in seetion 4 aboye, the inconsistencies arise because the 
degree of substitutability among commodities is significant1y different for different consumers. 
Figures 1 and 2 suggest that a "single crossing" property for the consumers' indifference curves 
might ensure Pareto consistency. This is the type of condition implied by the nonzero matrix 
of covariances in Proposition 5, but that proposition does not generalize to the case of more 
than two goods and two consumers. 
If the consumers receive fixed shares of aggregate income, then positive semidefiniteness 
of the matrix of covariances is essentia11y equivalent to the requirement that the consumers' 
demand vectors become more dispersed when their incomes a11 rise by the same amount. 
This "increasing dispersion" is plausible and has empirical support, d. Hardle, et. al. (1991), 
Hildenbrand (1994). If the consumers' income shares are fixed, then increasing dispersion 
is necessary in order for the fixed distribution rule to be optimal with respeet to a social 
welfare function. It remains to be seen whether increasing dispersion along with existence of 
a positive representative consumer implies Pareto consistency. 
We have shown that in important c1asses of communities (ones in which a11 goods are 
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normal or there is a positive representative consumer with homothetic preferences) there 
cannot be large Pareto inconsistencies for the degree of price variation in most applications. 
This does not extend the applicability of representative consumer models very faro There are 
many communities without positive representative consumers. And even if there is a Pareto 
consistent representative consumer, its preferences need not be appropriate for planning. The 
representative consumer's preferences are locally like a compensation criterion, cf. Jerison 
(1990). They attach greater weight to richer consumers who consume more. It might not be 
desirable to identify the representative consumer's preferences with social welfare even when 
this entails no logical inconsistency. 
Footnotes 
1. Kirman (1992) presents an example of Pareto inconsistency in which a "representative 
individual" has preferences that differ greatly from those of the actual consumers. But the 
indifference curves of the representative individual generate the aggregate demand vectors 
only at the two budget situations being compared, not at others. In the present paper, as in 
Samuelson (1956), Jerison (1984), Dow and Werlang (1988), we require that the representative 
consumer's preferences generate the entire aggregate demand function. The representative 
individual in Kirman's example is not a representative consumer in this sense. 
2. For vectors x = (Xl,"" Xn) and y = (YI,"" Yn) we write X ~ Y [resp. X 2: y] if Xj > Yj 
[resp. Xj 2: Yj] for j = 1, ... , n. 
3. In order for consumption to be Pareto efficient the distribution rule need not be differ­
entiable or homogeneous. We impose these rather weak restrictions in order to consider the 
cases most favorable for the existence of a representative consumero 
4. A function w is nondecreasing if u 2: r implies w(u) 2: w(r) for every u and r in thedomain 
of W. The function w is strictly increasing on a set if w(u) ~ w(r) whenever u ~ r for u and 
r in the seto 
3. A matrix M is positive definite on a set X if xT Mx > Ofor every X =1= Oin X. 
References 
G. B. Antonelli, 1886, "Sulla Teoria Matematica della Economia Politica", English transla­
tion in "Preferences, Utility and Demand" (J.S. Chipman, et. al. Eds.) Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, New York, 1971. 
20 
F. Bourguignon, and P.-A. Chiappori, Collective models of household behavior, European 
Economic Review 36 (1992) 355-364. 
J .S. Chipman and J.C. Moore, 1979, On social welfare functions and the aggregation of 
preferences, Journal of Economic Theory 21, 111-139. 
L. Christensen, D. Jorgenson, and L. Lau, 1975, The transcendentallogarithmic utility func­
tions, American Economic Review 65, 367-383. 
A. Deaton and J. Muellbauer, 1980, An almost ideal demand system, American Economic 
Review 70, 312-326. 
J. Dow and H. Sonnenschein, 1986, Samuelson and Chipman-Moore on utilíty generated 
community demand, in "Prices, Competition and Equilíbrium" (M. Peston and R. Quandt, 
Eds.), Philíp Allan, Oxford, 1986. 
J. Dow and S. Werlang, 1988, The consistency of welfare judgments with a representative 
consumer, Journal of Economic Theory 44, 269-280. 
E. Eisenberg, 1961, Aggregation of utilíty funetions, Management Science 7, 337-350. 
W. M. Gorman, 1953, Community preference fields, Econometrica 21, 63-80. 
J.-M. Grandmont, 1992, Transformation of the commodity space, behavioral heterogeneity 
and the aggregation problem, J. Economic Theory 57, 1-35. 
W. Hiirdle, W. Hildenbrand and M. Jerison, 1991, Empirical evidence on the Law of Demand, 
Econometrica 59, 1525-1549. 
R. E. Hall, 1988, Intertemporal substitution in consumption, Journal of Polítical Economy 
96, 339-357. 
W. Hildenbrand, 1994, Market Demand: Theory and Empirical Evidence, Princeton Univer­
sity Press, Princeton. 
M. Jerison, 1984, Social welfare and the unrepresentative representative consumer, SUNY 
Albany. 
M. Jerison, 1990, The compensation principIe, the representative consumer and the Ville 
axiom, in Preferences, Uncertainty, and Optimality, Eds. J.S. Chipman, et. al., Westview 
Press, Boulder. 
M. Jerison, 1994, Optimal income distribution rules and representative consumers, Review of 
Economic Studies 61, 739-77l. 
R. Kihlstrom, A. Mas-Colell and H. Sonnenschein, 1976, The demand theory of the weak 
axiom of revealed preference, Econometrica 44, 971-978. 
A. Kirman, 1992, Whom or what does the representative individual represent? Journal of 
21 
Economic Perspectives 6, 117-136. 
A. Kneip, 1993, Heterogeneity oí Demand Behavior and the Space oí Engel Curves, University 
oí Bonn Habilitation. 
S. Landsburg, 1981, Taste change in the United Kingdom, 1990-1955, Journal oí Political 
Economy, 89,92-104. 
A. Lewbel, 1991, The rank oí demand systems: theory and nonparametric estimation, Econo­
metrica 59, 711-730. 
R. E. Lucas, Jr., 1987, Models oí Business Cycles, Basil Blackwell, Oxíord. 
J. Muellbauer, 1976, Community preíerences and the representative consumer, Econometrica 
44, 979-999. 
A. Nataí, 1953, Sur des questions d'aggrégation en économétrie, Publications Inst. Stat. 
Universite de Lyons, 2, 5-61. 
M.K. Richter, 1979, Duality and Rationality, Journal oí Economic Theory, 21 401-451. 
P. Samuelson, 1956, Social indifference curves, Quarter1y Journal oí Economics, 70, 1-22. 
N. Stokey and S. Rebelo, 1995, Growth effects oí fiat-rate taxes, Journal oí Political Economy, 
103, 519-550. 
H. R. Varian, 1982, The nonparametric approach to demand analysis, Econometrica, 50, 
945-973. 
22
 
:\J 
~-d 
o ""'\O -. ~0 ~ 
.... O 
-h 
.
.
 
~ '. 
o' ~: 
-
• 
+; 
~.() 
~o ~ 
-.11\ 
~ ¡: 
~~ 
.~b,;n 
oS>
 
~ IA­
~ 
~ 
~ 
\ 
0\ 
~. ' \\ 
;. \ 
2..fi 
."i'V\ ~ ~~ 
.... i 
. 
~~ 
~e 
., \1\" 
<. 
1'> 
0\

., 
LQ'
- \
:s , ~ i\) \ -~ 
~
-..
 
~~
 
.,.;:s 
~V\ 
~ 
~ ~ (.), """\ 
\1\­
~ '"
 
® ~ 
.
'-...0-0 
o ., " 
o -, ~ 
:>~" f\ <..\ 
. ~ 
\-"-0 
, 
~ TI ~
